

Stability and Reconstruction Operations Planning: Embrace Before Pursuing the Interagency

A Monograph

by

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The aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom has prompted many to ask why did the U.S. military plan so poorly for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO)? Detailed analysis points to a reluctance on the part of the military to consider SRO a core competency. Therefore, in the near term the solutions to improving the ability of the military to plan and execute SRO are to be found inside the military, not through improvements in interagency coordination. This conclusion requires the recognition that the military's ability to plan and perform SRO tasks consists of several interrelated dimensions: definition of SRO as a basis for developing a list of associated SRO tasks; discussion of the current process used to plan SRO; and analysis of the organizations that have the capability to conduct SRO tasks. Ultimately, the analysis shows that SRO and combat are closely related. Therefore, military plans should address both from the onset instead of sequentially. Additionally, planners should focus on the transition to civilian control rather than the end of combat operations. Lastly, embracing the requirement for SRO will require significant leadership to overcome the reluctance to execute those tasks.

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Abstract

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS PLANNING: EMBRACE BEFORE PURSUING THE INTERAGENCY by Major Rafael F. Pazos, U.S. Army, 50 pages.

The execution of the post-hostilities phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom has prompted many to ask did why the U.S. military plan so poorly for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO)? Many studies have suggested that the lack of interagency coordination within the U.S. government was the cause of poor SRO planning and execution. However, detailed analysis of the nature of military operations, the military's responsibilities, and the limited capacity of agencies within the U.S. government point to a different reason; a reluctance on the part of the military to consider SRO a core competency. Therefore, in the near term the solutions to improving the ability of the military to plan and execute SRO are to be found inside the military, not through improvements in interagency coordination.

To reach the conclusion that the military ought to focus internally rather than pursue improvements to interagency coordination requires the recognition that the military's ability to plan and perform SRO tasks consists of several interrelated dimensions. The first dimension requires the definition of SRO as a basis for developing a list of associated SRO tasks. The second dimension is the current process used to plan SRO and the assignment of responsibility for SRO tasks. Investigating the second dimension reveals the potential contributions from the interagency, specifically, the potential contributions from organizational initiatives like the JIACG and the S/CRS. The last dimension consists of the universe of organizations that have the capability to conduct SRO tasks. The analysis of this dimension reveals the requirement for military forces to conduct SRO tasks.

Ultimately, the analysis shows that SRO and combat are closely related. Therefore, military plans should address both from the onset instead of sequentially. Additionally, planners should focus on the transition to civilian control rather than the end of combat operations. This is so because the military is likely the only agency with the capability to perform SRO tasks during and immediately after combat operations. Lastly, embracing the requirement for SRO will require significant leadership to overcome the reluctance to execute those tasks. Doing so ensures that the military considers the conditions needed to win the peace.

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INTRODUCTION

On 1 May 2003, President George Bush landed on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Against the backdrop of a “Mission Accomplished” banner, President Bush told the nation “major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.”¹ This speech followed the impressive performance of the coalition forces during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 43 days, coalition forces led by the U.S. attacked from Kuwait into Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime. All that remained was to conduct Phase IV of the plan – post-hostilities operations. However, after the fall of the regime, the positive images of people tearing down Saddam’s statutes quickly turned into images of uncontrolled looting and rioting. Within time, coalition forces managed to regain a tenuous control, but not before significant resistance groups were able to organize into an insurgency. Since the “Mission Accomplished” speech, the U.S. has suffered over 2,139 casualties and has spent over \$214 billion to gain control in Iraq.² Despite this effort, two questions remain, was this situation foreseeable and preventable? Moreover, why did the U.S. military seemingly have such a poor plan to provide stability and reconstruction following combat operations in Iraq?

The recent U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear the importance of stability and reconstruction during and after major combat operations. These experiences confirm that providing stability and reconstruction in the aftermath of combat operations is one of the

¹ George W. Bush, remarks aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (Washington, D.C.: White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1 May 2003); available <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/print/20030501-15.html>; internet; accessed on 23 January 2006.

² These costs reflect only direct U.S. Congress appropriations accounted towards Operation Iraqi Freedom through FY05. Actual cost estimates when including indirect costs are much higher and vary widely. More information is available in Table 3 of the CRS report by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report to Congress, 5 October 2005), 10. The total deaths figure for Operations Iraqi Freedom is as of the 21 February 2006. More detail is available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf>.

most challenging and time consuming foreign policy undertakings.³ Based on the literature published since, it is not evident what lessons the military should draw from these operations and how these lessons relate to previous experiences. However, it is clear that combat operations by themselves will not achieve the overall objectives of a military intervention. Hence, combat operations and stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) are interrelated and complement each other in achieving the U.S. security objectives.

In the aftermath of the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, many independent academic studies and Congressional hearings have addressed the issue of post-conflict performance. These studies have provided many recommendations for improvement in this area. One leading group of recommendations suggested that the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) to work together was the primary reason for shortfalls in planning and execution that produced poor post-conflict performance. The recommendations generally argued that DoD did not have sufficient capabilities to conduct SRO adequately, which in turn meant the solution was improvements in the interagency process. Other studies suggested that military planning methodologies were too linear to comprehend post-conflict conditions. Subsequently these recommendations called for changes in the way the military planned. The sum of these solutions means the military simply should develop different mental models to integrate seamlessly the requirements for SRO into combat operations. Lastly, others argued that the military's historical reluctance to embrace stability and reconstruction operations was the principal cause of the failure to provide for stability and reconstruction in the aftermath of the current conflicts. While these approaches all identify a close relationship between combat and SRO, the nature of the recommendations is significantly different.

Current discussions in the military and Congress to improve stability and reconstruction performance focuses on improving interagency coordination. For example, to fix the interagency,

³ Minxin Pei, "Lessons of the Past: The American Record on Nation Building," *Foreign Policy* 137 (July/August 2003): 1.

the Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) argued in its report, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Era*, for legislation to modify the current distribution of power and responsibilities within the executive branch of the U.S. Government.⁴ However, in the military's view improving interagency coordination generally meant transferring SRO requirements to a designated civilian organization.

Improving the military's ability to plan and execute SRO requires recognition that this problem is comprised of a series of interrelated dimensions. The first dimension defines the term stability and reconstruction in order to derive what tasks are associated with the term. The second dimension relates to the current processes used to plan for SRO. This dimension highlights the complexities of the current interagency systems and the potential contributions to the planning process by different interagency initiatives. The last dimension describes what organizations have actual capabilities to conduct SRO tasks. The analysis of each of these interrelated dimensions supports the finding that the military should focus internally on its ability to plan and execute for SRO before pursuing significant modifications to the interagency process.

Starting with a clear definition for SRO is the first step in addressing improvements to planning and execution for SRO. Historical examples related to military doctrine and operations provide a base from which to derive the definition for SRO. This approach illuminates how the SRO concept has evolved and how it relates to actual combat operations. Although the U.S. military performed many stability types of missions in the early twentieth-century, the impacts were minimal on the doctrinal understanding of stability and reconstruction as a military mission. In contrast, the majority of the military missions performed after the end of the Cold War have directly influenced the understanding of stability and reconstruction. Once armed with a clear understanding of SRO it is then possible to determine the tasks associated with providing SRO.

⁴ Clark Murdock and others, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, July 2005), 131-133.

Identifying the tasks associated with SRO helps to determine which agency has the responsibility to perform the tasks, and when to consider these tasks during planning. In particular, Operations Just Cause and Restore Liberty in Panama provide a solid framework that supports the contemporary understanding of stability and reconstruction incident to combat operations. These operations also highlight the typical tasks associated with SRO.

After identifying the tasks associated with SRO, it is then possible to determine when these tasks should be considered during planning. Doing so reveals the role of the interagency and how it contributes to both military planning and achievement of the stability and reconstruction objectives. A crucial activity during the planning process is to establish the criteria to transfer responsibility from the military to civilian control. The transition to civilian control is a critical event that shapes how military plans integrate SRO with combat. The planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom post-hostilities phase provides a good example that highlights the importance of correctly identifying the transitions from military to civil control. Iraq's post-hostility planning also provides insights into the inherent complexities of military operations and why the proposed interagency approach to developing integrated plans for combat and SRO is so difficult. That is, the analysis of the current planning process supports the conclusion that the military should first improve on areas that it can influence directly before seeking comprehensive interagency improvements.

Once the roles and responsibilities for planning SRO are determined, it is then possible to analyze who has the capability to conduct SRO tasks. The capability of the interagency to conduct SRO tasks is a critical consideration for the execution phase. Interagency contributions to the execution of SRO tasks are limited due to the limited deployability of other government agencies. Therefore, military planners must consider what tasks the military must conduct based on the limitations of other agencies. Comparing the tasks associated with SRO assists development of planning methodologies and identification of shortfalls in military capabilities. The crucial question is what type of military unit can bridge the gaps in execution. Therefore, in

order to answer the question of why do military forces seemingly plan for SRO so poorly, the term must first be defined.

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS DEFINITION

The term of stability and reconstruction operations seems to have an obvious and rather intuitive meaning. Nevertheless, its true meaning “in contrast, is actually sublime, going to the very heart of the American ethos.”⁵ Actual measures of stability and related military tasks are hard to quantify. It is much easier to define the negative, conditions associated with instability. A cursory look at terms used to describe military missions in the realm of stability and reconstruction reveals the difficulty in capturing the true meaning of stability. For example, the Army called the efforts to rebuild Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II occupations. In addition, the military referred to the military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.⁶ Most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military and the media used the terms post-hostilities, nation building and post-conflict to describe non-combat operations geared at facilitating the transfer of responsibility to a legitimate government. The fact the military uses these terms synonymously demonstrates the ambiguity associated with defining the true vision of the concept.⁷

The U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq highlight the importance of performing stability and reconstruction operations. To capture these requirements Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recently published the Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations (JOC-Stability). The concept addresses the critical components of SRO in a comprehensive manner by describing stability as the actions required to:

⁵ Michael Vlahos, “A “Post-Hostilities” Moment?” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 345.

⁶ James Dobbins and others, *America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 1.

⁷ Bathsheba Crocker, John Ewers, and Craig Cohen, “Rethinking and Rebuilding the Relationship between War and Policy: Post-Conflict Reconstruction.” In *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 360.

Establish a safe and *secure environment*; provide *essential social services*, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate, *local civil governance*. The objective is clearly to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity and eliminate as many of the root causes of the crisis as feasible to reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of another crisis. [emphasis added]⁸

Providing a safe and secure environment means that the military force must act in the aftermath of conflict to fulfill its inherent legal responsibilities towards the population absent a local government. According to the operating concept, armed forces execute stability operations to set conditions that enable a local government to reassume responsibilities at the point of conflict resolution. In the definition, there is no sharp line of separation between combat operations and stability and reconstruction operations.⁹ Therefore, military planners must embrace the fact that both combat operations and SRO are closely related and should be an integrated part of the overall operation.

The recently published DoD Directive 3000.05 *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, expands the concept of stability. The directive defines stability as “military and civilian activities performed across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”¹⁰ By defining stability in terms of military and civilian tasks, this directive clarifies that SRO and the other instruments of national power are related.¹¹ DoD Directive 3000.05 further supports the need to integrate all facets of an operation and to consider the conditions that lead the transition to civilian control.

The issue of transitions and distribution of responsibilities is important to understanding SRO. However, these transition points straddle an unclear and uncomfortable boundary between

⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept* (Norfolk, VA: U.S. JFCOM, September 2004), 3.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD* (Washington D.C: September 2005), 3.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Directive 3000.05 (Washington, D.C.: 28 November 2005), 2.

¹¹ The instruments of national power are generally referred to as DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic. For more information see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. JCS, 14 November 2000), I-5.

traditional developmental assistance and the required efforts to stabilize a country in the aftermath of combat operations.¹² Rather than considering these transitions a divide in actuality the transition from SRO to traditional developmental assistance is a continuum dependent on the overall security situation. One way to achieve success is to identify these transitions throughout the planning for military operations from start to finish instead of from the conclusion of major combat operations.

Using the definition of stability, military planners consider the logical categories and the associated tasks that the military forces must accomplish during combat operations to set the conditions for success in its aftermath. The definition of stability also implies that the military forces will perform SRO tasks in conjunction with combat operations. That is, military forces in most cases cannot postpone security measures and humanitarian relief activities until end of the so-called combat operations phase. To mitigate these circumstances, the plan must address the SRO and combat requirements upfront and not as an afterthought. Through a review of the JOC-Stability and DoD Directive 3000.05, the definition of stability and reconstruction operations clearly indicate that both combat and SRO are related. Additionally, it states that military forces are required to perform these tasks. Why then does the military seem to overlook these requirements? The evolution of Army doctrine provides insights into this question.

SRO as a Military Mission: Evolution in Operations Doctrine

The history of Army doctrine since the Vietnam War offers great insight into understanding SRO as a military mission. The Army's experiences in the aftermath of the Vietnam era helped shape its reluctance to plan and perform SRO. Doctrine written and adapted following the Vietnam War clearly shows a tendency to disregard the requirements to provide a stable environment during and after a conflict. For example, during the Vietnam War period, the

¹² Council on Foreign Relations. *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities* (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Publications Office, 2005), 4.

Army's FM 31-23 *Stability Operations* provided a detailed and comprehensive definition of the term stability. That manual defined stability in terms of the foreign internal defense and the internal developmental actions that the armed forces performed to provide the order that allows a government to function.¹³ A key element of the FM 31-23 definition was the concept that military forces performed stability operations and that these actions were a prerequisite for governments to operate effectively. The manual's focus on developing the foundations for a country capable of combating an insurgency is a clear reflection of the strategic context of the Vietnam War.¹⁴ However, in subsequent doctrinal publications the term stability was absent. In 1974, FM 100-20 *Internal Defense and Development* superseded FM 31-23. In 1981, the Army relabeled FM 100-20 as *Low Intensity Conflict*. Both versions of the manual moved away from emphasizing military forces in stability operations. Instead, both versions of FM 100-20 focused on the Army's institutional counterinsurgency experience in Vietnam.¹⁵

Following the Vietnam War, the Army's focus shifted back to Europe and so did its doctrine. Doctrine returned to the concept of the decisive battle, a concept of warfare that had proved successful in the past.¹⁶ The 1976 version of the Army's capstone publication FM 100-5 *Operations* reflected this desire to abandon the Vietnam experience. To Army leaders the combat experiences from the Vietnam conflict were an aberration that taught irrelevant lessons.¹⁷ Hence, the purpose of FM 100-5 was to emphasize the military's traditional role in combat operations. That field manual clearly stated that the Army's primary objective was "to win the *land battle* [emphasis added] – to fight and win in battles, large or small, whatever foe, wherever we may be

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations U.S. Army Doctrine*, Field Manual 31-23 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 October 1972), 1-1.

¹⁴ FM 31-23, 2-1 through 2-4.

¹⁵ Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations*, Leavenworth Papers no. 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1988), 6.

¹⁶ Vlahos, 346-347.

¹⁷ Herbert, 98-99.

sent.”¹⁸ The subsequent evolution of the FM 100-5 shows how the Army reluctantly expanded Army responsibilities outside the land battle. For example, the 1982 version of FM 100-5 changed the focus of the Army from winning the land battle to deterring war and acknowledged that the Army executed contingency operations as directed by the National Command Authority. Additionally, that manual stated that military operations were a subordinate and an important component of achieving national objectives. The 1986 version of the Army’s operations manual introduced the requirement to consider responsibilities generally considered under the concept of stabilization. In the chapter for civil-military operations which was now considered a major functional area of Army operations, the manual stipulated that civil-military operations were important in “meeting the legal and moral obligations to the local people.”¹⁹ These obligations implicitly indicated that commanders should consider actions beyond engagements. Particularly those actions were required to provide stability in the aftermath of combat operations.

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States changed its foreign policy focus. The new foreign policy shifted attention from deterrence and maintenance of the status quo to objectives that were politically more ambitious. In the post Cold War strategic environment, military interventions could pursue objectives such as transforming torn societies into governments that were more democratic. Military interventions during this period continually expanded the military’s role in this new environment. For example in Haiti, the military’s primary objective was to return President Aristide to power in order to reestablish the legitimate government.²⁰ In Somalia, the military forces initially intervened to ensure humanitarian relief supplies reached the starving population. The military repeatedly stated that these non-combat

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 July 1976), 1-1.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1986), 57-58.

²⁰ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Staff College Press, 1998), 47.

missions had a negative effect on the organization as a whole because they reduced its combat readiness and diverted limited resources from war fighting focused activities.²¹ Future versions of the Army operations manuals reflected the tension between the Army’s internal perception of its role and the missions the military performed.

The first version of FM 100-5 after the end of the Cold War paid more attention to stability operations. In the 1993 version, the Army introduced the concept “post-conflict” as a type of Army operation. The manual defined post-conflict operations as actions executed by the military required to minimize the confusion resulting from the aftermath of combat actions. The manual recognized that “anticipation and appropriate planning during earlier stages will smooth transitions … after the fighting stops.”²² The manual however, did not describe what “appropriate planning” meant. Despite this, it accurately noted the requirement to consider actions necessary to establish order and rebuild critical infrastructure in the aftermath of a conflict.

In all the early versions of the Army’s *Operations* manual, the description of combat operations was incomplete. The doctrine distinguished between non-combat operations, named Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and combat operations. The distinction made it easier for planners to ignore the requirements to synchronize both combat and non-combat actions. Considerable infighting within the Army about the role of non-combat missions delayed the publication of the next operations manual, FM 3-0 in 2001.²³ The new manual introduced the concept of full spectrum operations. Under this concept, military missions are composed of a combination of four distinct types of operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. The

²¹ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004), 87.

²² U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993), 3-11.

²³ William J. Gregor, “The Politics of Joint Campaign Planning” (paper presented at the 2005 International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, IL, 21-23 October 2005), 7.

type of mission would determine which operation had the preponderance of effort. In this construct, stability operations would likely be the main effort in post-conflict scenarios. However, the relationship between stability operations and offensive operations was not well defined. Absent detailed guidance, planners either overlooked or underemphasized the importance of integrating combat with SRO. In many ways, the term was simply a more palatable expression to define missions previously in the category of MOOTW – peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, show of force, and humanitarian civic assistance.²⁴

The evolution of military thought expressed in the Army's doctrinal manuals highlights the reluctance of the Army to plan for SRO during planning for combat operations. That reluctance derives in part from the Army's collective lessons from the Vietnam experience and from the doctrine developed to confront the Soviet threat in the European theater of operations during the Cold War. By failing to embrace SRO, Army planners ignored SRO during combat operations and left those tasks for subsequent operations. Nonetheless, the operational experience from military interventions highlight that the armed forces are capable of conducting SRO. Using both the definition and the development of operational doctrine it is possible to develop actual tasks associated with SRO and to determine how these tasks are interrelated to combat operations.

Stability and Reconstruction Operations Tasks

The strategic objectives for an operation provide the initial framework from which to derive the associated SRO tasks. To assist military planners, the JOC-Stability envisions four cases in which the armed forces will perform stability operations. These cases range from U.S. participation at the request of a friendly government dealing with internal security issues to interventions to defeat non-state organizations that threaten the stability of a large portion of a

²⁴ U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 2001, 1-14 through 1-16, and 9-6.

population. The concept defines “Case 2” as the most dangerous and complex of these situations. “Case 2” deals with the stability required as the result of a major combat operation focused on defeating a hostile regime.²⁵ In these interventions, SRO will be complex and will inherently occur in conjunction with major combat operations. The required SRO tasks are indeed very large and broad. The range of these tasks will vary greatly depending on the actual security conditions and on how military forces altered the environment during offensive operations. Therefore, military planners should focus on using a planning framework that ensures that they consider the basic conditions required to achieve stability.

The book *Winning the Peace*, edited by Robert Orr provides a useful conceptual framework from which to derive the types of tasks required during SRO. The book identifies four key areas called pillars that Orr deems essential to providing stability following combat operations. The pillars are security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. The security pillar includes those actions that address the public safety and allow for the conditions required to develop a legitimate security apparatus. The second pillar called governance and participation focuses on the development of political and administrative institutions that ensure public participation. This pillar is more than simply conducting elections; it includes developing the required political processes to facilitate transparent public participation. The third pillar, social and economic well-being, addresses the population’s needs and the development of a viable economy. In the early stages of a conflict, the tasks in this pillar generally focus on providing emergency relief and restoring essential services. The last pillar called justice and reconciliation focuses on establishing a legal system that can address past abuses. This pillar balances the requirement between creating or reestablishing an independent judicial system based on the rule of law and reconciling the

²⁵ Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, 3-5.

defeated.²⁶ Each of these pillars addresses an important dimension of the larger problem of providing long-term stability. Although these functional pillars are important, their identification is not particularly difficult. The difficulty occurs in trying to determine the priority of effort and the associated tasks.

The military's initial focus during and in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations is on tasks associated with the security and the social and economic well-being pillars. The reason for this focus is that until the prerequisite level of security in a country is achieved efforts in the other pillars of SRO can prove futile.²⁷ Even under the best circumstances, a regime change will almost undoubtedly crumble the security structure of a society, which can result in chaos and disorder.²⁸ The potential requirement to provide law and order after the collapse of a country's security infrastructure is one of the most challenging aspects of SRO planning. Incidentally, providing security to the population during and in the aftermath of conflict is a very controversial issue. An issue the military generally considers outside its requirements. That is, during combat operations the military's focus is on defeating the enemy's forces and not on performing SRO tasks.

The second critical area to consider in developing a list of SRO tasks is the requirement to improve the social and economic well-being of the populace. Within this pillar, military forces embrace the requirement to plan and potentially provide essential public services such as emergency medical care, food, and water. Ultimately, meeting these social needs increases the legitimacy of the U.S. intervention. The tasks within this pillar support developing the legitimacy of the host nation interim government. Again, in all situations the military is most effective if it

²⁶ Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 10-12.

²⁷ Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., 4,8.

²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities: Supporting Papers* (Washington D.C.: January 2005, 78-79).

can accomplish SRO tasks during or immediately following defeat of conventional combat forces without significant delay.²⁹

Military planners should also consider how to manage information operations effectively during SRO. The plan should consider information themes that support military actions and improve the legitimacy of those actions. These information themes are different from Robert Orr's concept of pillars in that the themes encompass tasks in all the pillars. For example, the military's ability to communicate the status of operations and transfer tasks to the indigenous population is very important for establishing the required security environment.³⁰ Another critical theme is directed towards changing the population's perception of the indigenous political and military institutions. Improving the population's view speeds the transition from U.S. or coalition led to host nation authorities. However, the emphasis on these themes does not imply that military forces performing SRO should simply focus on quickly transferring responsibilities to host nation forces. Rather, it implies that the military's actions must recognize the primacy of the host nation by maximizing the efforts to legitimize the government.³¹ The ultimate goal of information operations in SRO is to gain popular acceptance of the national regime. Acceptance of these themes by the populations increases the ability of U.S. or coalition forces to perform SRO tasks until host nation gains sufficient capacity to do them internally.

DoD Directive 3000.05 *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* provides guidance and assigns responsibility for planning, training, and performing stability and reconstruction within the DoD. Noteworthy in Directive 3000.05 are the three overarching tasks that DoD must perform in SRO. These tasks are rebuilding indigenous security institutions required to stabilize the environment; reviving private

²⁹ In Progress Review brief to Chief of Staff of the Army on the Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations (AFA S&RO). 1 April 05. Received via electronic mail, copy on file with author, Slide 63.

³⁰ Defense Science Board, *Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, 40.

³¹ John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002): 92.

sector through bottom-up activities and rebuilding infrastructure; and creating representative government institutions. The directive also mandates that the military should be prepared to “perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”³² The directive makes it clear that the critical transition point in a military intervention is not the conclusion of combat operations but rather the transfer of power to legitimate civilian control. Despite the progress that DoD Directive 3000.05 represents, the three stability tasks identified in the directive are too general to serve as a guide for military planners and the directive provides no real guidance on how to accomplish those tasks. The directive assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy responsibility for developing a comprehensive list of stability tasks. However, the list has not yet been published.³³ Therefore, absent DoD guidance, military planners can expand the list of tasks in DoD Directive 3000.05 by using a framework like Robert Orr’s in *Winning the Peace*.

Due to the requirements established in DoD Directive 3000.05, it is of limited value for military planners to develop an all-inclusive list of SRO tasks. The scope and variety of tasks the military will perform is almost endless when compared to the variety of different conditions under which SRO missions may occur. However, these lists can prove valuable as a starting point. For example, in *Winning the Peace*, Robert Orr provides a 21-page appendix with recommended SRO tasks organized into his functional pillars for post-conflict reconstruction.³⁴ Likewise, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) from the DoS published a 54-page document called the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* that expands on the work from *Winning the Peace*.³⁵ Therefore, the focus of military planners should be to develop a framework which can then be adapted to a particular mission. The premise of this

³² DoD Directive 3000.05, 1-2.

³³ Ibid., 4.

³⁴ Orr, 305-327.

³⁵ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* (Washington, D.C.: S/CRS, 21 March 2005), 1-54.

framework is that combat actions and SRO are closely related. Additionally it implies that military forces must establish a secure and stable environment in the aftermath of combat operations. The bottom line is that there is no definitive list of SRO tasks, despite the fact that directives exist that assign responsibilities for them. However, some very good frameworks such as Orr's and the S/CRS essential tasks pamphlet offer a way to develop SRO tasks for a military intervention.

Many authors have recommended different approaches that address proposed responsibilities and tasks for the military during SRO. In *Reconstructing Iraq*, Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill from the Strategic Studies Institute developed a comprehensive list of tasks that the military forces should consider in a post-conflict Iraq. Crane and Terrill developed a mission matrix consisting of 135 tasks required to reestablish the Iraqi state. They then divided the tasks in the mission matrix into critical, essential, and important based on the potential for mission failure and assigned the tasks to one of 21 functional mission categories. Crane and Terrill also attempted to identify lead agencies for each task in the different phases of the operation.³⁶ For example, coalition forces are responsible for establishing and maintaining a police system in the security phase. Responsibility for the police system was later transferred to the DoS Bureau International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the institution-building phase. The authors of *Reconstructing Iraq* emphasized starting stability tasks during combat operations and not after.³⁷ Developing SRO tasks using a mission matrix is useful but it should consider realistic agency capabilities required to perform SRO.

³⁶ Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 46-47.

³⁷ Crane and Terrill, 66

Ultimately, the actual security conditions and the U.S. strategic objectives for the military intervention determine the programs and SRO tasks for an operation.³⁸ However, in generic terms, the military should consider tasks structured along functional categories such as the pillars of post-conflict reconstruction from *Winning the Peace*. Moreover, the military's initial focus is to provide an adequate level of security that allows for the accomplishments of other programs and tasks. Military planners must account for both SRO and combat tasks during the planning process because the tasks required to achieve stability are closely related to combat operations. The military faces a bigger challenge when faced with the need to assign responsibilities for planning and accomplishing the SRO tasks. A look at Operations Just Cause and Restore Liberty in Panama highlight the military's reluctance to integrate combat operations and SRO. The poor integration of combat and SRO tasks during the planning process resulted in significant difficulties in the U.S. effort to restore order in the aftermath of the invasion.

Operations Just Cause and Restore Liberty: Separate SRO and Combat Plans

Operations Just Cause and Restore Liberty in Panama provide insights into the military's ability to plan and execute SRO. These operations show the military's reluctance to embrace the requirement to consider combat and SRO concurrently. They also highlight the problems related to the transition to civil control. These problems, in the case of Panama, came directly from the failure to synchronize the combat and the civil-military plans. Contributions from other U.S. government agencies during the planning process would have undoubtedly improved the execution of the plan. However, the source of the problem was not the lack of contributions from other agencies. Rather, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) framed the campaign objectives incorrectly which in turn contributed to poor execution.

³⁸ Andrew S. Natsios, "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development," *Parameters*, Vol. XXXV, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 12.

Planning for the Intervention

Planning for U.S. military action against Panama began in February 1988 when two U.S. grand juries indicted General Manuel Noriega. These indictments prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to request USSOUTHCOM to develop options for military action. General Fred Woerner, Commander of USSOUTHCOM, directed his staff to prepare two plans. The first, called Blue Spoon, focused on using military force to remove Noriega from power. The second, called Blind Logic, was a civil-military plan designed to restore Panama after the Noriega regime fell.³⁹ Unfortunately, the designated staff sections developed these plans independently. The operations section, SCJ3, developed Blue Spoon while the plans section, SCJ5, developed Blind Logic. Because the reserve officers from the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade developing the Blind Logic plan lacked the required security clearances, they were unaware of the details of Blue Spoon. General Woerner placed significant emphasis on the development of the plan for the restoration of Panama. He believed that the Blind Logic plan was independent of combat operations. Moreover, in Blind Logic the commander assumed that the military would run the government in the aftermath of combat operations. USSOUTHCOM based the assumption that military forces would run the Panamanian Government for about 30 days on doctrine, history, and General Woerner's guidance. This recommendation was forwarded to the JCS for consideration, but was never approved.⁴⁰

Following Noriega's indictment, the relations between the U.S. and Panama deteriorated. For example, Noriega asked Cuba and Nicaragua to help him organize civilian defense committees. Their assistance resulted in the creation of civilian paramilitary units called "Dignity

³⁹ John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 5,7, and 10.

⁴⁰ Fishel, 8.

Battalions.” The purpose of these units was to collect intelligence and to control the population.⁴¹ Noriega also harassed U.S. personnel stationed in Panama. The tensions between the U.S. and Panama reached a new high when Noriega nullified the May 1989 election. Noriega’s actions led President George Bush to set four strategic objectives for a possible intervention into Panama. The objectives were protecting American lives, ensuring implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, restoring Panamanian democracy, and bringing Manuel Noriega to justice.⁴² However, neither Blue Spoon nor Blind Logic addressed how military forces were going to restore democracy to Panama. Additionally, Washington thought General Woerner’s was weak so he was replaced by General Maxwell Thurman in September 1989.⁴³ The changing political climate in Panama and the change of command in USSOUTHCOM prompted revisions to both Blue Spoon and Blind Logic plans.

The XVIII Airborne Corps was the joint task force (JTF) headquarters for Blue Spoon. However, under General Woerner the Corps was not responsible for developing the plan. That changed when General Thurman took command. Before the official change of command, General Thurman held a meeting with the XVIII Airborne Corps commander Lieutenant General Carl Stiner. During that meeting, General Thurman made Lieutenant General Carl Stiner responsible for the entire operation. General Thurman said “I’m putting you in charge of all forces and you’ve got it: planning, execution, the whole business.”⁴⁴ While the change was intended to improve the unity of effort during planning and execution it, nevertheless, had unintended consequences. At General Stiner’s direction, the military’s main effort shifted from the center of the major cities to critical targets on the periphery of the cities along the Panama

⁴¹ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988-January 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 6.

⁴² Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York, NY: Simon & Shuster, 1991), 86-90.

⁴³ Woodward, *The Commanders*, 83, 98.

⁴⁴ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: NY: Lexington Books, 1991), 55-56.

City and Colon axis. Under General Woerner's original plan U.S. military forces would attack the center of the cities and then move towards the outside while maintaining control. General Stiner's approach of employing forces on the periphery created a security vacuum in the center of the cities. Under the XVIII Airborne Corps's interpretation these security tasks were part of USSOUTHCOM's other plan – the civil-military plan.⁴⁵ In other words, the JTF largely ignored the implied non-combat tasks associated with the plan. As the planning progressed, the lack of coordination between Blue Spoon and Blind Logic became more apparent. The JTF plan tasked the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade to establish a Joint Civil Affairs Task Force (JCATF) while the USSOUTHCOM plan called for the same unit to become the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF).⁴⁶ The conflicting tasks are evidence that USSOUTHCOM had no mechanism to ensure both plans were coordinated.

Execution of the Operation

On 16 December 1989, during a routine stop at a security checkpoint the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) killed U.S. Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz. The next day President Bush issued an execution order for the Blue Spoon plan under the name Operation Just Cause. In the early hours of 20 December, the operation began with nearly simultaneous special operations and conventional force attack on 27 critical targets.⁴⁷ In one instance, a task force of 1,300 rangers reinforced by 2,700 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Infantry Division conducted an airborne operation to secure the critical targets of Tocumen International Airport in the east and Rio Hato the main PDF training base in the west.⁴⁸ Likewise, the level of combat proficiency demonstrated by other combat units was also impressive. The U.S. military forces secured the majority of their objectives within the first 24 hours. On 24 December, the military conducted the

⁴⁵ Fishel, 27.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 34.

⁴⁷ Donnelly, 94, 99-101.

⁴⁸ Cole, 38-39.

last planned combat action, an attack on the PDF's west most location in the Chiriqui Province. That same day, Noriega who previously had narrowly escaped capture, surrendered to the Vatican Embassy. The negotiations between the Vatican and U.S. officials to extradite Noriega from the papal nuncio took an additional ten days. Overall, the combat operations for Operation Just Cause were very successful.

At the start of Operation Just Cause, USSOUTHCOM also received approval from the JCS for the execution of Blind Logic under the name Operation Promote Liberty. USSOUTHCOM named the SCJ5 the commander for the CMOTF.⁴⁹ However, the execution of Operation Promote Liberty was tenuous at best. The successful attacks by the JTF on the periphery created a security vacuum in the center of Panama City. The lack of security forces coupled with armed interference by Noriega's Dignity Battalions placed downtown Panama City in a state of chaos for the first four days of the invasion. Damage estimates from the looting that ensued range from \$1-2 billion.⁵⁰ Operation Promote Liberty was not executed with the same vigor and precision as Operation Just Cause. It was obvious that there was no real plan to provide security in the city and likewise there was no plan to replace the PDF once they were defeated. Acting without guidance, the commander of U.S. Army South Major General Marc Cisneros created an organization called the U.S. Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) to assist in the reconstitution of the security forces.⁵¹ The security situation only improved as the conditions matured in Panama. Ultimately, General Thurman ordered the CMOTF to provide more support to the U.S diplomatic effort.

Integration of Combat and SRO During Planning and Execution

USSOUTHCOM did have a plan to remove Noriega militarily and a plan to restore order in the aftermath of combat. What USSOUTHCOM lacked was a concept to unify the actions

⁴⁹ Fishel, 29.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 29.

⁵¹ Ibid., 36-37.

under these plans. Neither plan directly supported restoring democracy, the ultimate strategic objective. Operation Just Cause focused exclusively on the capture of Noriega. Conversely, Operation Promote Liberty was completely uncoordinated with the combat plan. When asked his opinion of the execution of the plan General Thurman stated that he "did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC [Commander in Chief]; ... the least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic. . . . We put together the campaign plan for Just Cause and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration."⁵² Likewise, the JTF focused only on the combat actions and did not "accept its implied mission in the CMO arena."⁵³

Based on the overwhelming success of the combat phase in Operation Just Cause it is very likely that the military learned the wrong lessons from Panama. The lessons learned process did not capture the failure to plan for the security of the population and the rebuilding of the security forces. The recent Defense Science Board report *Transition to and From Hostilities* evaluated the performance of U.S. post-conflict performance in Panama as failing in all ten measured categories.⁵⁴ However, military assessments at the time such as that by General Collin Powell, the then Chairman of the JCS, indicated that the operation was a complete military and political success.⁵⁵ A RAND report on Operation Just Cause cautioned in 1996 that many of the conditions that U.S. forces encountered were very favorable. The report suggested that it was unlikely that the United States would perform many more unilateral operations in a country with no significant cultural or religious difference. In Panama, the military faced no organized resistance, limited amount of urban combat, and the vast majority of the population supported the

⁵² Richard H. Schultz Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Operation Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Press University, August 1993), 16.

⁵³ Fishel, 23.

⁵⁴ Defense Science Board, *Transition To and From Hostilities: Supporting Papers*, 6.

⁵⁵ Woodward, *The Commanders*, 194.

U.S. intervention.⁵⁶ Operations in Panama highlight the importance of starting the planning process from the transition to a legitimate government. The plan should have identified the SRO tasks required once the critical targets were secured.

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

Ideally, the military develops SRO plans in conjunction with other U.S. Government agencies, coalition partners, and participating Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). Additionally, these plans thoroughly synchronize SRO and combat operations to ensure efficient execution. This approach seemingly would produce an effective plan. The participants would contribute to the planning process and assume responsibility for performing tasks within their respective competencies. Unfortunately, currently no such processes or systems exist. Even within the U.S. Government, planning in a multi-agency environment necessitates changes to the current political system to achieve interagency coordination.⁵⁷ Although a seamless interagency approach constitutes an ideal goal, the reality is the military must develop comprehensive plans that accomplish national objectives. For example, the military is required to develop plans in accordance with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or as directed by the National Security Council (NSC).⁵⁸ The development of these mandated plans cannot wait for the development of better interagency coordination mechanisms.

Presently, interagency coordination for stability and reconstruction occurs at the NSC. The NSC is an advisory body to the president, responsible for coordinating the actions of the military services and other federal departments on issues of national security.⁵⁹ President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD) establishes three committee levels of

⁵⁶ Jennifer M. Taw, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other than War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), vii-viii.

⁵⁷ Murdock and others, 20.

⁵⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0. (Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, 10 September 2001), III-3.

⁵⁹ National Defense University, *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, Jan 2003), 6.

policymaking. The committees are the principals committee (PC), the deputies committee (DC), and the policy coordination committees (PCC). The PCCs are the lowest committee level in the NSC. The NSPD-1 established 11 functional PCCs and 6 regional PCCs. The PCCs constitute the working group level committee and created to streamline the previously system of multiple Interagency Working Groups (IWG) authorized during the Clinton administration under the Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).

Under PDD-56, the NSC established an IWG to conduct planning in the case of a complex contingency operation. The IWG was responsible for developing and implementing a political-military plan that incorporated the contributions of all federal agencies and departments. However, PDD-56 did not consider appropriate enforcement mechanisms. The lack of enforcement mechanisms in addition to the reluctance of agencies to work together marginalized the effectiveness of PDD-56.⁶⁰ To address the shortcomings in PDD-56, President Bush published NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* in December 2005.

NSPD-44's stated purpose is to improve the "coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance" of the U.S. Government. The directive assigns to the DoS the primary responsibility to coordinate U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Additionally, NSPD-44 establishes the authority to create a PCC level committee for SRO.⁶¹ The goal of the PCC level committee is to develop plans for SRO that are integrated with military plans when combat operations are required. The guidelines in NSPD-44 are very similar to the policy guidance for complex contingency operations in PDD-56.⁶² However, the implementation language in NSPD-44 is not authoritative due restrictions placed on the executive branch by the

⁶⁰ Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., 108-109.

⁶¹ National Security Council, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, National Security Presidential Directives 44 (Washington D.C.: U.S. NSC, 7 December 2005), 1-3.

⁶² Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook, 9 and B-1 through B-4.

legislative branch of the government. For example, the directive cautions that it does not “affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces.”⁶³

Ultimately, both the PDD-56 and NSPD-44 directives fall short in addressing planning for SRO in a true interagency environment. The lack of effective enforcement mechanisms ensures that the PCC for SRO will continue to face significant challenges. The unintended consequence of these challenges is that SRO will be addressed separate from combat operations, effectively hampering synchronization between combat and SRO tasks.⁶⁴ However, the PCC does provide a forum in which to develop the strategic objectives of an intervention and to assign agency responsibilities.

Changing the current interagency coordination process is very hard because the process is complex. Therefore, the military cannot rely solely on this venue to improve SRO planning capabilities. For example, in March 2004, Senators Biden and Lugar from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee presented the “Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act.” The act’s purpose was to “establish a more robust civilian capability to respond quickly and effectively to post-conflict situations.”⁶⁵ The Senate has not yet submitted this bill for a vote even though the scope is more modest than recommendations in reports like *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*. Likewise, the Defense Science Board’s study *Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD* noted that truly integrating interagency operations at the DoD level would require the creation of a Deputy Under Secretary for Defense position because of the shear complexity of the current interagency environment.⁶⁶ Again, based

⁶³ National Security Presidential Directives 44, 5.

⁶⁴ William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, “Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2000): 95-96.

⁶⁵ Congress, Senate, Richard Lugar, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing on the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act*, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 March 2004, 1.

⁶⁶ Defense Science Board, *Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, 24.

on the inherent complexities involved in modifying the current interagency structure, the military should consider pursuing areas that it can influence internally.

Planning in an interagency environment should result in a coherent strategy along with coordinated guidance for those assigned important tasks.⁶⁷ When combat operations are likely, military planners ought to develop comprehensive plans that synchronize both combat and SRO tasks essential for accomplishment of the strategic objectives. The requirement to synchronize both combat and SRO tasks applies to both deliberate and crisis action situations. Although the military planning process is well defined, the incorporation of other agencies into the planning process is not. For example, under the current joint deliberate planning process, the combatant commander develops an interagency annex for the Operations Plan (OPLAN) called “Annex V.” The interagency annex provides guidance to joint forces on how other agencies will participate in the operation. It also describes the conditions for transition of responsibilities to civilian agencies or the host nation.⁶⁸ Unfortunately, what is not institutionalized within the military are procedures for considering both the requirements for combat and SRO equally during the planning process. The fact that interagency coordination is an annex in the back of the OPLAN means it is very likely that SRO requirements will be considered only after the major portion of the plan has been completed.

Joint doctrine and DoD Directive 3000.05 emphasize that the military is responsible for developing comprehensive plans that include combat and SRO actions to accomplish strategic objectives. The military’s responsibility for the overall plan does not imply that the military should plan in a vacuum. On the contrary, the military plan should incorporate the expertise from civilian agencies from the onset of planning.⁶⁹ Inclusion of key government agencies early in the

⁶⁷ Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook, 8.

⁶⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, Volume I, Joint Publication 3-08, Approval Version (Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, February 2005), II-16.

⁶⁹ Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, 38.

planning process facilitates the eventual transition to civil control. However, when considering how to incorporate other agencies into the planning process, it is important to understand the limitations of other agencies. This is especially true when discussing the level of support required for deliberate military planning. Interagency participation at the combatant commander level is not as well structured or resourced as that found at the NSC level. Furthermore, at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level where the process is more time constrained there is even less interagency representation.⁷⁰ Based on these interagency limitations, the military planning effort should focus on developing integrated plans that consider the critical SRO tasks. This approach ensures that the planning effort considers the conditions through transition to civil control instead of focusing solely on the conclusion of major combat operations. Again, the logical choice for someone to synchronize and lead the interagency contributions is the geographic regional combatant commander. This recommendation is based on the military's emphasis on planning, the systematic approach to solving problems, and the availability of resources within the military.⁷¹

Based on the lessons learned from the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the operations in Iraq the DoD and DoS have implemented two organizational solutions designed to improve the military's ability to plan and execute SRO. First was the creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) in the combatant commander staff. Second was the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the DoS. These two organizational solutions potentially improve the SRO planning process by increasing the number of subject matter experts in non-military areas available to the military. However, the JIACG and the S/CRS are only complements to the military's responsibilities to develop comprehensive plans for operations.

⁷⁰ James C. Royse, "Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 13.

⁷¹ JP 3-08, II-15.

The JIACG is a “multi-functional advisory element on the combatant commander’s staff that facilitates planning, coordination and information sharing across the interagency community.”⁷² The NSC approved the JIACG concept in 2002 in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. This concept evolved from JFCOM’s Unified Quest and Millennium Challenge exercises. Every regional combatant commander tailors the JIACGs based on their requirements. In general, the JIACG core element consists of approximately 12 staff members representing different departments and agencies of the federal government. The JIACG has the potential to coordinate portions of the military plan that require resources from other agencies or departments.⁷³

Although the creation of the JIACG is a positive first step towards improving interagency coordination there are significant challenges resourcing this initiative. In addition to resource concerns, the JIACG personnel have no mechanism to influence their respective organizations if there are problems with the plan or additional support is required. Lastly, the military has no mechanism to ensure that the JIACG is properly resourced. The limitations of the JIACG mean that military planners will not realize the full potential of this initiative because it is not reliable. The long-term solution to resourcing the JIACG ultimately relies on legislative changes, an executive order, or departmental decisions to resource the positions based on the perceived mutual benefits of participating in the JIACG.

The S/CRS from DoS is the second organizational solution created to improve SRO performance. President Bush created the S/CRS in July 2004 in direct response to the lessons learned from operations in Iraq. The broad guidance given to the S/CRS was to “develop policy

⁷² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 6 (Norfolk, VA: U.S. JFCOM, 27 June 2004), 5.

⁷³ JWFC Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 6, 2-7 and 10.

options to respond to failing and post-conflict states.”⁷⁴ The S/CRS charter is to coordinate and institutionalize the capability of the U.S. Government civilian agencies performing stability and reconstruction.⁷⁵

The S/CRS organizes to support three policy echelons. At the strategic level, the S/CRS participates as the lead for the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) that serves as a PCC level committee. The CRSG coordinates the SRO input from all relevant agencies. Based on the nature of the operation the S/CRS envisions the CRSG will function as a stand-alone PCC or as an augmentation to one of the six regional PCCs. Ultimately, the CRSG presents policy recommendations to the NSC’s principals and deputies committees. Although the command relationship between the S/CRS organizations is not well defined, the CRSG receives information from participating agencies to help shape the policy goals.

The next level of organization at the S/CRS is the Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST). The HRST is an 8 to 12 person deployable team of civilians with regional and functional expertise. The team supports the combatant commander when an emerging crisis potentially requires the use of U.S. military forces. The HRST support the combatant commander in developing plans that consider the conditions to achieve stability in the aftermath of the combat operations. Additionally, the HRST “recommends criteria and conditions necessary to transfer lead efforts from the military to civilian lead.”⁷⁶ In practice, the HRST locates itself within the combatant commander staff and works closely with the political advisor (POLAD) and the JIACG. Working in conjunction with the POLAD and the JIACG the HRST facilitates the integration of contributions from other agencies into the combatant

⁷⁴ John C. Buss, *The State Department Office of reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense*, Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Volume 09-05 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2005), 2.

⁷⁵ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *About the S/CRS*. Available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2005.

⁷⁶ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Planning for Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Conflict Termination, Experimental Pamphlet*, Draft (Washington, D.C.: S/CRS, 29 September 2005), 2.

commander's plan. However, the HRST has no capabilities to perform any SRO tasks. It can only coordinate and facilitate the information flow between the military and other departments or agencies.

The last S/CRS organization that supports military planning and execution is the Advanced Civilian Team (ACT). The ACTs are deployable teams comprised of up to 20 personnel with expertise in multiple disciplines required in post-conflict scenarios. The ACTs primarily support the tactical forces by assessing requirements once the operations begin. The ACT performs a myriad of tasks to support SRO. These tasks extend from negotiating with local political leaders to coordinating humanitarian assistance through U.S. agencies.⁷⁷

Due to the S/CRS' short existence, the duties and roles of their different organizations are constantly evolving. The S/CRS is refining its concepts constantly based on experiences derived from training and the real world. However, trends in funding continue to be problematic and worrisome. The S/CRS estimated it needed \$82 million for fiscal year 2005 but received only received a total of \$17 million from a supplemental appropriation for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. With that budget, the S/CRS could only hire a staff of 37 people instead of the 80 people required.⁷⁸ In contrast, the Defense Science Board estimated that an S/CRS type of organization required a staff of 250 people.⁷⁹ Notwithstanding budgetary shortfalls, the S/CRS can provide assistance to the military's ability to plan SRO in conjunction with combat. However, due to the budgetary constraints and limited authorities the S/CRS does not directly improve the military's ability to perform SRO tasks.

The JIACG and the S/CRS provide a way for the military to include many subject matter experts from other agencies and departments during the planning process. The inclusion of their diverse perspectives can potentially improve the overall plan which ultimately can lead to a more

⁷⁷ S/CRS Experimental Pamphlet, Draft, 4.

⁷⁸ Buss, 2.

⁷⁹ Defense Science Board, *Transition To and From Hostilities: Supporting Papers*, 112.

efficient transition to civil control. The consideration of these perspectives can also assist military planners in identifying critical SRO tasks that the military must perform during and after major combat operations. Therefore, the JIACG and the S/CRS can potentially bridge some of the current challenges to implementing a true interagency planning environment. Despite their contributions to the planning effort, neither of these organizational solutions provide the military with capabilities to perform SRO tasks. At best, the JIACG and S/CRS can recommend which governmental agencies are capable of replacing military efforts once the security conditions permit. Ultimately, the military is responsible for the detailed planning and execution of SRO until the transfer of responsibilities to civil agencies. That is, the military planner should focus on the requirement to plan through the transition to civil control instead to the end of combat operations.

Transitions: From Military to Civil Control

The JOC-Stability provides transition guidance to military planners. Planners should begin the planning process at the point of transition to civil control instead to the end of combat operations.⁸⁰ For military forces, the goal is to return to a “new normal” where the military contributes through more traditional programs such as the theater security cooperation activities. Generally, responsibility is transferred to a host nation government, another U.S. government agency, or a recognized international organization. Transitions are important because they support the legitimacy of U.S. interventions, which is a prerequisite for long-term success.⁸¹ However, as William Flavin cautions, transitions are not the exit strategy.⁸² Hence, the transition should focus on the security, governance, economic, and social conditions that allow for civil

⁸⁰ Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, 38.

⁸¹ Ibid., 29.

⁸² William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” *Parameters*, Vol. XXXIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 102.

control. The transition does not imply a redeployment of military forces. Rather, it implies a recognition that the overall security conditions are improving.

The S/CRS and the JIACG contribute to planning for transition to civil control. A stated role of the HRST is to define the conditions for the transfer from military to civilian lead.⁸³ The capacity of the civilian organizations to perform tasks initially performed by the military units typically determines the transition from military to civilian lead. Traditionally U.S. Government agencies lack the capability to deploy quickly. For example, in post-conflict environments the host nation does not usually have the capacity to provide basic law and order. Planners must estimate the civilian security requirements and the resources needed to provide a civilian security capability.⁸⁴ Developing police forces is the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). However, the ICITAP deploys slowly. Therefore, in the case of local law and order, the military must perform these tasks until the appropriate civilian capability can be created.

The current draft JP 5-0 *Joint Operations Planning* introduces the new doctrinal term "mission success criteria." Mission success criteria are the "military effects necessary to accomplish the mission." Furthermore, achievement of the mission success criteria must be based on related measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.⁸⁵ Therefore, the mission success criteria provide realistic conditions upon which to determine when to transfer responsibility to civilian lead. The emphasis on these assessments should occur both during and after the combat operation. This is important because conditions early in the conflict can affect the stability conditions in its aftermath.

⁸³ S/CRS, *Planning for Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Conflict Termination, Experimental Pamphlet*, Draft, 2.

⁸⁴ Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Elliot M. Goldberg, eds., *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 14-16.

⁸⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, Revision Third Draft (Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, 10 August 2005), III-10.

Conrad Crane states that in stability operations nothing “has been more problematic for American forces than the handover to civilian agencies.”⁸⁶ Crane developed a graph to illustrate the transition from military to civil control. The upper portion of figure 1, displays the ideal conditions for transition from the military to civil control. In this scenario, the notional military capability is initially much higher than civilian and host nation capability. As time progresses, the civilian organizations quickly increase their capability allowing the military to reduce its requirements. This reduction is proportional to the increase in civilian capability. The host nation capability increases at a slower rate. Overtime the host nation capability overtakes both the U.S. civilian and military capability. In the ideal model, the first transition is from the military to civilian agencies. A second transition follows from the civilian organizations to the host nation. However, reality is different. Based on experience, Crane suggests that civilian agencies are much slower to deploy and to provide capability. Therefore, the transitions tend to occur well after the planning estimates indicate. The delay also affects the reduction of military capability. Realistically, over time the host nation gains capability at a greater rate than the civilian organizations. Therefore, the military could transfer control directly to the host nation instead of U.S. civilian organizations. The importance of this model is to ensure that military planners adjust the plan for transition based on the capabilities required not a set timeline.

⁸⁶ Conrad C. Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,” in *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. DeToy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, Sep 2004), 12.




Figure 1 - SRO Transition From Military to Civil Control (Source: Crane and Terrill, 45)

The importance of performing detailed planning for the transition to civil control is to ensure that military actions are achieving the strategic objectives. The focus on a transition ensures a unity of effort among U.S Government agencies throughout the entire operation. Moreover, the clear focus on transition conditions places responsibility directly on the military to ensure that conditions do not deteriorate. The focus on the correct transition point is a way for the military to frame effective plans.

Operations Iraqi Freedom: Defining the Correct Transition

The planning for Phase IV, called post-hostilities, during Operation Iraqi Freedom provides an example with which to illustrate the challenges the military continues to experience in embracing the requirements for SRO. Touted as a new age in warfare with the slogan “shock and awe,” the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom was unimpressive when compared to the combat success. The lessons learned in the aftermath of this conflict resemble lessons learned many times before. In particular, operations in Iraq demonstrate the importance of synchronizing

combat and SRO tasks during the planning process and focusing on the correct transitions to achieve the stated objectives. The operations in Iraq, just like in Panama, demonstrate the combatant commander's responsibility for the military contribution to achieving the end state. In Iraq, by focusing on the removal of the regime instead of the broader political objective, the military plans failed to prepare the way for restoring Iraqi governance.

Planning for the Intervention

In August of 2002, the NSC principals committee met to finalize the recommended policy guidance for the potential conflict in Iraq. The overarching goal of the U.S. in Iraq was to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction. However, the objectives and strategies pointed to a broader and more ambitious goal, to “liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny, and assist them in creating a society based on modernization, pluralism and democracy.”⁸⁷ While the NSC formulated the Iraq policy, Central Command (CENTCOM) and its land component command (CFLCC) were refining versions of the Iraq plans. Discussions between the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Frank modified the versions of the plan of attack. The plan refinements generally reflected a desire by the Secretary of Defense to use a smaller force that could deploy into theater much faster than the force the military initially recommended.⁸⁸

Early on in the planning process, military planners were considering the conditions after combat. CFLCC began serious Phase IV planning in conjunction with the campaign plan development in July 2002.⁸⁹ In the last iteration of the plan, called Cobra II, CFLCC included a list of specified stability tasks that the ground subordinate units would have to execute during

⁸⁷ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York, NY: Simon & Shuster, 2004), 155.

⁸⁸ Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2004), 389-391.

⁸⁹ Kevin C.M. Benson, “‘Phase IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. DeToy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, Sep 2004.), 179-181.

combat operations. In addition, the commander's guidance envisioned a rolling transition to Phase IV based on the geometry of the battlefield. Units were to control as they went. However, based on the limitations imposed on the plan by the Secretary of Defense it is not clear how the forces were to accomplish all the stated tasks, in particular tasks that supported the transition to Phase IV. The challenges to provide stability and reconstruction during and after the combat phase became obvious during the war-gaming process. On 17 March 2003, two days before the start of the ground war, the CFLCC J5 recommended creating an entirely new plan. Based on this requirement CFLCC then developed the plan for SRO called Operation Eclipse II.⁹⁰

Although CFLCC did develop a plan for Phase IV, the timing suggests that the Phase IV planning was an economy of force effort during the entire planning process.

Concurrent with the DoD planning efforts for Iraq, the DoS and other federal agencies also planned for post-conflict Iraq. A common understanding among those that analyzed the post-conflict situation in Iraq was that the problem would be difficult and would require a lot of resources.⁹¹ For example, as early as October 2001, the DoS stood-up a think tank called the “Future of Iraq Project” to look into the conditions for a post-Saddam Iraq. The “Future of Iraq Project” drew on an assortment of experts to develop a thirteen volume final report with broad recommendations along seventeen functional areas. Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started a series of “war-game” exercises in May 2002 that looked at issues like civil disorder after the fall of Baghdad.⁹² The level to which these initiatives influenced the military plan is not as important as the fact that multiple agencies across the federal government were thinking about the implications of removing Saddam from power.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 182.

⁹¹ Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, *Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office*, Policy Analysis Paper No. 560 (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute Press, 11 January 2006), 22.

⁹² James Fallow, “Blind into Baghdad,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004): 57-60.

In January 2003, the NSC issued NSPD-24 creating the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). ORHA's charter was to consolidate all Phase IV planning efforts under DoD.⁹³ The Secretary of Defense chose retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner to oversee this effort. Garner quickly assembled a staff of experts and began to focus on planning for post-Saddam Iraq. From its inception, ORHA's command relationships, authorities within DoD, and authority to liaison with other departments in the federal government were not well defined. Furthermore, based on their late arrival in Kuwait, CFLCC did not perceive ORHA's contributions as very helpful.⁹⁴ Ultimately, ORHA played only a marginal role in developing CENTCOM's SRO plan. However, because NSPD-24 assigned ORHA an overarching mission, military planners from CENTCOM attempted to pass most Phase IV responsibilities to ORHA.

Transitions and Embracing SRO

Across multiple departments and agencies of the U.S. Government there were significant efforts expended to consider the Phase IV conditions in Iraq. These efforts tended to remain within the agency performing the plan. However, based on the high degree of accuracy that post-conflict plans for Iraq demonstrated it is clear that planners have the capability to consider SRO and combat simultaneously. A more significant shortcoming in the military's plan was the implicit assumption that after the combat operations phase the responsibility to conduct SRO would transition quickly to other forces or organizations. Therefore, both of CFLCC's plans Cobra II and Ellipse II defined their end state as the transition to CJTF-7. This focus created a false sense of security since initially CJTF-7 was CFLCC and later V Corps was designated

⁹³ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 283.

⁹⁴ Kenneth O. McCready, "Waging Peace: Operations Eclipse I and II – Some Implications for Future Operations" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 9-10.

CJTF-7.⁹⁵ That is, DoD focused their planning on removing the regime and not on the entire post-conflict effort.⁹⁶

CENTCOM did not identify the transition to civil control during Phase IV very effectively. Again, the focus on regime change versus creating the condition to allow for a democratic Iraq influenced General Franks' reluctance to assume ownership of Phase IV. He sought to make certain that "the Department of Defense bureaucracy, especially ORHA ... owned Phase IV."⁹⁷ In General Franks' own words "Washington needed to get ready for the occupation and reconstruction – because combat operations just might be over sooner than anyone could imagine."⁹⁸ However, just like the lessons from the intervention in Panama there is only one place for the Phase IV planning directive, that is, at the regional combatant command. Again, it seems that this lesson is only partly learned.⁹⁹

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS EXECUTION

Currently the capability of other agencies and departments of the U.S. Government to execute SRO tasks is very limited. This limited capability is further reduced in situations when the military is required to conduct combat operations. Therefore, the execution of SRO tasks during the combat phase and immediately following its conclusion will be the responsibility of military forces. To address this requirement the Army established the Army's Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (AFA S&RO) group. The AFA S&RO evaluated the tasks associated with SRO and determined the shortfalls currently within the Army and recommended what units should execute these tasks.

⁹⁵ Benson, 186.

⁹⁶ McCreedy, 8.

⁹⁷ Fishel, John T. "Planning for Post-Conflict Panama: What it Tells Us About Phase IV Operations," in *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. DeToy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, Sep 2004), 177.

⁹⁸ Franks and McConnell, 441, 442.

⁹⁹ Fishel, 177.

The AFA S&RO evaluated the SRO tasks along the lines of the economy, governance, and security supported by information themes. The AFA S&RO then looked at tasks required along the spectrum of conflict from activities prior to conflict through the reconstruction period. According to the group, the spectrum of conflict concludes when the conditions reach a new status quo or “new normal.” Along the spectrum of conflict, the team envisioned gradual transitions from U.S. or coalition control to host nation civilian control. Likewise, the tasks changed as the mission progressed. Initially the emphasis is on the safety of the population and then gradually changes toward establishing a national identity. The task list concluded with those that responded to the needs of the state. The team then analyzed the range of tasks the military should have responsibilities for under an SRO mission and analyzed the current force capabilities to accomplish them. According to the study, Army forces were required to perform 425 SRO tasks, 227 from the Universal Joint Tasks List (UJTL) and 198 from the Army Universal Task Lists (AUTL).¹⁰⁰ Of these tasks, Army and Joint, an overwhelming preponderance dealt directly with the security environment.

The AFA S&RO study identified tasks in which the Army currently displayed a shortfall across the elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). The study concluded that there were eight tasks in which the Army currently had shortfalls within the DOTMLPF framework. The tasks ranged from the ability of Army forces to provide command and control for military, interagency, and non-governmental organizations to the ability to facilitate economic development.¹⁰¹ These shortfalls created gaps

¹⁰⁰ AFA S&RO, Slide 17.

¹⁰¹ The report identified eight tasks in which the Army had shortfalls along the DOTMLPF framework. These were: (1) Provide command and control for S&RO (includes coordination with OGA and NGO). (2) Assess, repair and reconstruct critical infrastructure. (3) Minimize immediate threat to the affected populace and enable transition to broader humanitarians operations. (4) Facilitate orderly transition to indigenous security forces. (5) Support transition to accountable self-governance. (6) Support the development of culturally appropriate institutional systems such as judicial, corrections, police, and civil administration. (7) Set conditions for and support economic development. (8) Support DoD and RCC efforts to amplify indigenous voices (legitimate political, religious, educational, and media) promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy. The group then recommended Army initiatives

from which the team recommended initiatives the Army could pursue to develop the needed capabilities. Not surprisingly, the tasks that the AFA S&RO identified fall in line with tasks outside combat operations that are required to achieve the enduring objectives of a military intervention. In fact, many of the recommendations designed to bridge these gaps focused on cultural and leader development programs within the Army. For example, to minimize the shortfall in developing culturally appropriate institutional systems, the report recommended improved joint-interagency-multinational home station training and increased language requirements for junior officers. However, to institute these recommendations requires Army leaders to consider this training equally important to traditional combat-oriented training events such as live fire ranges and field exercises. That is, to implement changes to the way SRO is performed will require sustained leadership involvement to ensure that the military forces maintain their focus.¹⁰²

When performing SRO tasks it is important to designate the force that will perform them. Determining the appropriate force to perform SRO missions is key to analyzing the relationship between combat and SRO. Furthermore, this analysis reveals that doctrinal reluctance to embrace SRO extends to identifying the forces that perform these missions. Correctly addressing which forces are appropriate to perform this mission also helps in defining transitions. Currently, there are two different arguments over the type of forces that should perform SRO tasks. One argument calls for the creation of specialized units or special purpose forces that would perform SRO either in conjunction or after the conclusion of combat operations. A second argument calls for the use of general purpose forces to perform both combat and SRO missions. That is, the general-purpose force would perform SRO with the assistance of some specialized forces.

to address the gaps. See Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations brief to the Chief of Staff of the Army slides 37-44 for more detail.

¹⁰² Defense Science Board, *Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, 12,20.

The AFA S&RO recommendations to bridge the SRO gaps propose few organizational solutions. The report's findings are that "general purpose forces with rapid access to modular capabilities appropriate for S&RO will be more effective than SPF [special purpose forces]."¹⁰³ The AFA S&RO does not support the creation of a special purpose SRO force because historically they require great augmentation from general purpose forces and the special capabilities are required at all echelons. Similarly, the Defense Science Board in their study *Transition to and from Hostilities* recommends against the creation of specialized units.¹⁰⁴ The report argues that all general-purpose forces should have the capability to conduct SRO operations based on the complexity, size, and duration of SRO missions.

The book *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, concludes that the U.S. military should field two division size organizations capable of performing SRO and two joint military headquarters capable of controlling SRO missions. Binnendijk and Johnson base their recommendations on their assessment of the current threat environment as described in the Defense Quadrennial Review of 2001.¹⁰⁵ General-purpose forces cannot accomplish SRO tasks because the force's capability and number of units required for SRO is too large to be assumed as an additional duty for general-purpose forces. Binnendijk and Johnson argued that a country's size and the operations' complexity determine the force required for SRO. From that relationship and using the population data of sample countries, they determined that the United States required at least two division size units for SRO.¹⁰⁶ In the book, the authors argue that only specific military occupations such as engineers, civil affairs, and military police are required to perform SRO. The authors' conclusion that special purpose forces are required is based on the conception that SRO tasks are subsequent and distinguishable from combat. The reality is that military units must be

¹⁰³ AFA S&RO, slide 13.

¹⁰⁴ Defense Science Board, *Transition To and From Hostilities: Supporting Papers*, 122.

¹⁰⁵ Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., 130-131.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 42-49.

able to change seamlessly from one type of operation to the next based on the situation. A better approach is to consider the new Army modular units as building blocks that can be augmented with special capabilities for particular SRO missions.

The Army's new modular force concept supports the use of general-purpose forces to conduct SRO. The Army is currently changing its force structure to become a more modular and interchangeable force. The Army will change the primary fighting component from the division to brigade combat teams. Within this design, supporting brigades such as the maneuver enhancement brigade will possess the preponderance of traditional military specialties required for SRO. However, in the design process to date, the Army has focused primarily on developing the combat brigades without much effort on the modules required for SRO tasks.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, the doctrine does not describe how commanders will use the same units to perform combat and stability tasks. For example, how will commanders deal with bypassed units or towns when tasked to provide local security, governance, and continue combat actions? The answer under the modularity concept could be to use a supporting brigade or a request additional modular maneuver units and attach them to the brigade combat team. The Defense Science Board report cautions the Army that "modularity, in and of itself, does not ensure an effective stabilization capability."¹⁰⁸ Developing these capabilities will require a change in mindset that SRO missions are in fact a core competency within the Army. Correctly identifying the capabilities that are required also allows the military planners to determine the conditions for transitions.

CONCLUSIONS

The ongoing conflict in Iraq has demonstrated once again that the U.S. cannot accomplish the objectives of a military intervention through combat actions alone. The U.S. must be able to develop and then execute effective plans for stability and reconstruction operations.

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *2004 Army Transformation Road Map* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2004), 3-4 through 3-9.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities* (Washington D.C: December 2004), 48.

Stability and reconstruction operations are complex, ambiguous, and closely interrelated to combat. Therefore, military plans should address both combat and SRO from the onset. Developing SRO plans sequentially rather than concurrently increases the potential for mission failure.

Historically the military has been reluctant to embrace the requirements to consider SRO as a core competency. The military culture reflects how this reluctance has permeated into the development of doctrine. Therefore, the military's reluctance to embrace SRO as a core competency is a significant factor contributing to the military's inability to develop effective plans for SRO in conjunction with major combat operations. Understanding these constraints allows military planners to think through the requirements to accomplish combat and SRO tasks simultaneously.

The newly published doctrine and directives are key first steps towards improving the military's ability to plan and execute SRO. The DoD Directive 3000.05 succinctly assigns the military the requirement to perform SRO tasks and to consider these tasks as important as combat. However, the implementation of this directive will require significant leadership commitment by Army leaders to overcome the military's reluctance to embrace SRO tasks with the same zeal as combat operations. Although, new doctrinal concepts expand on the requirement to execute SRO they generally fall short of providing the requisite level of detail planners need to develop operational level plans.

Federal initiatives to integrate the instruments of national power better are positive but results are elusive. The JIACG and the S/CRS are important improvements to the interagency coordination process. However, they are only a part of the interagency planning solution. The reality is that other government agencies simply do not have enough capacity to adequately resource these initiatives. Rather, concepts like the S/CRS and the JIACG provide the military with expertise that facilitates the traditional military planning process. These initiatives do not, however, eliminate the military's responsibility to develop plans for operations that consider the

full spectrum of operations. One potential risk on relying on solutions within the interagency is that the military cannot control the results. Additionally, substantial changes to other agencies require the involvement of the executive and the legislative branches of the government. Notwithstanding these limitations, the military should encourage and pursue coordination to improve the relationship with other federal agencies and non-governmental organizations. Ultimately, the military will handover the operation to a follow-on agency or a newly established government.

The analysis of the tasks and responsibilities associated with SRO highlight the central role that the military plays. This central role is crucial to providing the requisite security during and in the aftermath of major combat operations. The SRO environment is very dynamic and the conditions can change very quickly across the spectrum of conflict. For this reason, the Army should not develop forces exclusively for SRO. Rather, Army forces should be able to adapt to the environment based on the conditions. The tasks associated with SRO also highlight potential shortfalls in organizations, personnel, and experience within the Army. Part of embracing the requirement for performing SRO as a core competency is to develop the capacity to perform the required tasks.

Ultimately, the challenge the military faces is to develop the conditions that allow for the transfer of control to other agencies or the host nation. Again, because combat and SRO tasks are interrelated, the military should not view the end of combat as the key transition. Rather, the scenario should determine the conditions for the transition. Only doing so, will ensure the military views the actions during combat as a prerequisite for the stability and reconstruction operations that can actually win the peace.

APPENDIX A – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACT	Advanced Civilian Teams
AFA S&RO	Army's Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations
AUTL	Army Universal Task Lists
CFLCC	Combined Force Land Component Commander
CENTCOM	Central Command
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMOTF	Civil Military Operations Task Force
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
DC	Deputies Committee
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
FM	Field Manual
HRST	Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
IWG	Interagency Working Groups
JCATF	Joint Civil Affairs Task Force
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JOC-Stability	Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations
JP	Joint Publication
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	Joint Task Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	National Security Presidential Decision
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PC	Principals Committee
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee
PDD	Presidential Directive Decision
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SRO	Stability and Reconstruction Operations
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
UJTL	Universal Joint Tasks List
USFLG	U.S. Forces Liaison Group
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command

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